Introduction
How do we protect the sexual autonomy of an intoxicated person? Alternatively, perhaps a more pressing question is whether we need to protect intoxicated people from their own decisions. When it comes to intoxication and rape, the law seems to mostly be concerned with protecting victims from decisions others have made for them, essentially removing their freedom and capacity to choose who, when, where and how to have sexual relations. Somehow, the criminal law has to a igate a a to espe t a i di idual s ight to seek out su h elatio s, hilst also upholdi g thei right to refuse. 1 It is with this giving or withholding of consent that we exercise our autonomy and navigate our lives.
2 As Wallerstein has pointed out:
(positive) sexual autonomy is valuable only insofar as it allows a capable individual to make valuable decisions as to her sexual activity.
3
Whilst the introduction of a definition of consent within the Sexual Offences Act 2003 was welcomed, whether it has adequately encompassed the voluntarily intoxicated victim and accused is an area which has given the courts food for thought. The voluntarily intoxicated victim must rely only upon the standard consent definition contained in section 74 Sexual Offences Act 2003 unless they were unconscious when the sexual act was performed. It has been suggested that the decision in Dougal 4 led to government concern if there is sufficient protection within the 2003 Act for victims who are vulnerable and genuinely lack capacity. 5 However, what the courts have been unable to establish from the wording of the statutory definition is exactly where the line is to be drawn so that an individual who is not yet unconscious may have lost the capacity to give a meaningful and legal valid consent to sexual intercourse.
Involuntary but not voluntary
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 established a rebuttable presumption for the victim involuntarily intoxicated that consent will not be present; 6 however, no such presumption has been laid out for victims who are responsible for their own intoxicated state. Although the government report "etti g the Bou da ies suggested that intoxicated victims should be included alongside those who are asleep or unconscious, 7 without mention of how they came to be intoxicated, this was not included in the 2003 Act for fear of , ali ious a usatio s .
8 This has caused academics to recognise the Report as being much more progressive than the legislation we were finally left with in 1 recognising the perils of twenty-first century courtship. 9 However, even if it had been included in section 75, there would still be the same difficulty in deciding the amount of intoxication sufficient and insufficient to invalidate consent. 10 Although this area of the law remains fraught with tension, it is not necessarily a common element. That is to say, cases where it is questioned if the victim had the capacity to consent are vastly outweighed by cases where it was questioned if the intoxicated victim did in fact consent at all, though it is speculated by some that such incapacity cases are under-represented because it is difficult to build a case in a situation where memory lapses are often prominent.
11 Though the cases of this nature which see a prosecution may be few, there is still a need to fully understand both when a person loses their capacity to consent through intoxication, and how to proceed when two people, u de a intoxicated fog at the time of the incident, 12 give very different accounts of whether or not consent was present. Essentially, we need to assess if there was no capacity to consent, or no consent despite capacity, and we do not have a clear road ahead. 13 As the Home Office stated in their Report: It was also noted that this does not negate the role of the common law to develop and assess new issues as they arise, 15 but is that the correct arena for intoxicated rape, given the majority of cases involve alcohol consumption? The silence of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 on rape accusations involving excessive drinking on the part of the victim (or perhaps the defendant too) is deafening. Leaving voluntarily intoxicated victims to be dealt with this way, while the involuntarily intoxicated victim is automatically presumed to have not consented to sexual relations, implies a hierarchy, with special protection for those who do not choose to intoxicate of their own accord. 16 How does this mesh with the objective of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to assist and encourage victims to come forward? 17 The low conviction rates suggest that the law remains inadequate with plenty of room for improvement.
18

Alcohol-fuelled Sexual Relations
The fact remains that many rape accusations involve a scenario where the victim was intoxicated, with one American study finding 60% of victims had consumed alcohol prior to the incident, with a 19 Alcohol plays a major part of adult social interactions in Western Society. One media outlet referred to such cases as going to the heart of contemporary mores, and the place where alcohol, sexual adventu is a d the la ollide .
20
Those who do choose to indulge and do so on a regular basis will likely be aware of the impact alcohol may have on their behaviour and decision-making process. Perhaps this is the goal for some; to lower their inhibitions and let their proverbial hair down. The difficulty comes when two people, who may have even consumed alcohol together have different recollections of hat happe ed e t . Although a uai ta e ape al a s ea s ide tif i g the suspe t is a u h easie task, in reality it may be much more difficult to prosecute and convict.
21
The A e i a Model Pe al Code s Co e ta otes that li uo a d d ugs...a e o o i g edie ts i the itual of ou tship .
22
Kramer has even identified commercial companies openly depicti g al ohol as a aph odisia .
23
When we talk about the capacity of an intoxicated person to choose whether or not to engage in sexual relations, some speculate that this may not only include not understanding the activities they are engaging in, but an i authe ti o se t hi h is out of ha a te fo the i ti a d ill undoubtedly be heavily regretted when sober. 24 Is it just the capacity to understand that this is se ual i te ou se, o is so e a tual su je ti e deli e ati e p o ess e ui ed too?
25 Bree appears to have set the threshold very high when it comes to this argument.
26
Capacity is often linked to concepts of knowledge and understanding, but this definition is more akin to issues of age and mental illness or disability
27
-much as the explanatory notes for the Sexual Offe es A t e plai the o d apa it ithi se tio to o e . 28 In cases of intoxication, does capacity have a different meaning? As Firth notes, the Bench Book offers little guidance, simply stating that the jury decides on the issue of capacity.
29 This is true -it will depend on the facts, but what can we look for in the facts to signify incapacity?
We do not legally allow someone to get a tattoo whilst intoxicated, but this is likely akin with public opinion, as Goodman has noted. 30 This same opinion is unlikely to extend to making intoxicated consent to sex invalid, as long as we are capable of making up our minds. 31 What we need to ask of the voluntarily intoxicated victim, or in fact, any intoxicated victim, is could she make a choice, and if yes, what did she choose? As the trial judge stated in Kamki:
I a state of di a d d u ke a a e ess, a pe so a ot e i a o ditio to ake hoi es . What would certainly be beneficial here is an indication as to what signifies when a person is in such a condition as to render them unable to make choices. As Elliott a d De Tha ote, a legislative espo se to the ea i g of apa it ould e app op iate fo pu poses of p o idi g la it , athe than situations it might cover. 33 In medical law, capacity requires an ability to comprehend or retain information material to making that decision. 34 Though the Bree decision is championed as the holy grail of voluntary intoxication and rape, 35 there remains no sure way of detecting if a victim is beyond the realm of making choices. Indeed, even if large quantities of alcohol have been consumed, the victim may remain absolutely capable of giving valid legal consent. 36 If we cannot ha e a g id s ste as as oted i Bree, are there other physical precursors that may be used as a checklist? This will be discussed.
Bad Decisions
Many of the cases on alcohol-related rapes find a sympathetic ear in light of the victim and the situation they found themselves in. Being separated from friends, 37 trying to get home, and making de isio s e e the i ti ould dee ad i et ospe t. Bad decisions and regrets must be distinguished from the situation at the moment of penetration, as difficult as this can sometimes be.
Regret seems to play a prominent role in discussion of false reporting. Though the victim may be responsible for getting drunk, they may not be responsible for their consent -if they consented at all. 38 However, if the victim did have capacity and did consent, that is a consequence of their voluntary intoxication they must deal with, even if regrettable.
It is noted that by Ryan that women take risks when intoxicated that they would normally avoid, 39 but this risk-taking may be just be one reckless aspect of the reckless act of intoxication itself. That is not to say that the victim is necessarily responsible for the circumstances that may come about. As Kramer speculates, the consumption of alcohol can interfere with the ability of a victim to remove themselves from a situation which is unwelcomed, or even dangerous. 40 If a person chooses to drink, or even get drunk, this does not mean they also choose to have sex, 41 and the trauma of rape should e e e a gi alised o e a i ti s hoi es.
42
Double Standards
A prevalent problem, particularly in cases of the mutual voluntary intoxication of acquaintances, is that hile the a used ill e gi e the e efit of easo a le dou t i assessi g a situatio hile intoxicated, the victim will be held partially responsible for their own demise. Much as provoking conduct has traditionally relegated a murder charge to manslaughter, the alleged rape victim who is d u k, alo e, a d ea i g little is also dee ed a ou ta le fo this p o o ati e o du t . In other areas of criminal law, cognition of the accused takes centre stage, 43 as opposed to behaviour control. If a defendant is intoxicated, we ask if they could form the necessary mens rea for the crime, rather than asking if they would have acted in the same manner had they been sober. For the victims, their level of intoxication is also a very important fact. It could bring into play both memory loss and incapacity. The relevance here ends -why they chose to drink, what they chose to drink and where they chose to go are not necessarily relevant. However, this seems to be at the fo ef o t of ot o l the ju s i d, ut the judi ia too.
Victim-Blaming and Accused Exculpation
44 Though there may be evidentiary issues with alcohol-related memory-loss rape victims, this sends a very different message as to who is to blame for the assault. Rather than seeing the situation as the risk of rape being increased when a victim is intoxicated, the prevailing thought seems to be that if the victim created the situation, then they are responsible for it. A study in 2005 found that 30% of participants thought a woman was partially or wholly responsible if raped when intoxicated, 45 p esu a l e ause she is the autho of he o isfo tu e .
46
As Wallerstein infers, although getting drunk and therefore making yourself vulnerable may be an a t of stupidit , 47 this does not diminish the responsibility of the accused, and if anything, should increase it. Ho e e , it is uestio a le if the defe da t is espo si le fo the i ti s d u ke behaviour rather than just his own.
48 ' a uestio s if i to i atio i ulpates o e ulpates the a a used of ape .
49
It is t ue to sa that a i to i ated a a e less attu ed to the i ti s desires when intoxicated, 50 but this is the risk he also takes with his choice to become intoxicated. Just as the victim is aware their behaviour may be affected, so is he.
Much of these thoughts may be linked to the stereotypical and very traditionalist views of men and women in patriarchal society. As Kramer notes:
The t aditio al elief that e ust e the se ual agg esso s hile o e ust t to appea haste sa i g o e e he the do ot ea it, e ai s pe asi e .
51
Alcohol is often believed to i ease the a s adherence to his gender role, whilst it has the opposite effect on the female victim, lowering her inhibitions and allowing her typically feminine behaviour to alter. Therefore, his culpability is reduced, whilst hers is increased, e ause so iet views women who drink as sexually promiscuous and a epta le ta gets fo se ual assault .
52
Subscribing to this theory is a spectacularly worrying thought. It allows cases to be labelled as sedu tio athe tha ape.
53 Our perceptions of men and women have evolved far beyond this in the twenty-first century, and the criminal law must reflect this. 54 
55
This narrow interpretation of the true crux of the matter ignores both male reactions and male rape. 56 Indeed, in a study with focus groups faced with a case of similar facts to Bree, more attention was given to the defendant being wrongly accused than to the harm this event caused to the victim. 57 There was more concern for the att i uti g of the la el apist athe tha e aluati g if rape had actually occurred. 58 Though these acquaintance-rapes featuring voluntary intoxication are often viewed as less serious, research shows that the effects of such encounters are often greater victimisation, and longer recovery time. 59 There are also feelings of ei g at fault fo la k of autio a d u a a ted t ust.
60
The victim already blames herself, but it is not necessary for the criminal law to follow suit if she did not consent or lacked the capacity to do so. In Bromwich, 61 the defe e s oss-examination of the victim made sure to have her admit that she had gone out with her friends on the night in question with the purpose of getting drunk. Why is that relevant? The culpability does not lie with this choice but the choices made at the time of the act of sexual intercourse. Elvin has suggested that the judges in Bree missed a vital opportunity to elaborate on the fact that assessing the circumstances for the purposes of determining reasonable belief in consent does not include the victim impairing their own judgment by drinking alcohol.
62
The reality is that the end result of voluntary intoxication may be just the same as all of the other situations covered by the list of rebuttable presumptions in s75 Sexual Offences Act 2003, namely that sexual autonomy is eroded.
63
This e osio is ot aused the i ti s d i ki g, ut the a used s a tio s i iolatio of thei ou te pa t s ishes. He hooses fo his victim, regardless of their capacity to choose themselves or their lack of consent. If the victim chooses intoxication, this does not and should not negate protection of the law.
64
Both or Neither?
Are they both reckless? Are they both vulnerable? Perhaps, if it is a situation where both the accused and victim got intoxicated together, this is a path to consider. Hurd ponders this same thought, stating that responsibility should not vary among actors:
so that the drunken man who has sex with a woman he knows is not consenting is responsible for rape while the drunken woman who invites sex is not sufficiently responsible to make such sex o se sual .
This might take the notion a little too far, but may be worth considering for the drunken man who misses non-consent precursors due to his intoxicated state. We already know that drunk intent is still intent and this offers no excuse, 66 and that the reckless act of intoxication itself sufficiently covers reckless mens rea and basic intent crimes. Wallerstein argues this must be distinguished from victims because while both involve deliberate choice, there are vast differences between intention and consent.
67
Is thei fault i olu ta il getti g d u k fo o e a d ot the othe ?
68 If intoxication increases the risk that something might go wrong, or there could be unwanted consequences which flo di e tl o i di e tl f o the i to i atio , ho is espo si le fo sha ed isk-taki g , he the accused and victim get drunk together?
69
' a asse ts that if this is the s e a io, the oth a e victi s o eithe a e i ti s . 70 There is no reason why one should have the responsibility of staying sober enough to judge the situation correctly.
71 This is almost affirmed in Bree, where it was held that the victim would not be relinquished from choices made whilst drunk just as the accused would not be.
72
This argument is countered by Kramer, who asserts that women should be able to drink without fea i g assault o a a usatio that the asked to e aped .
73 Whilst this is correct, it can also be said to extend to men, who would wish to be able to get drunk without the fear of being accused of rape by a victim who regrets their intoxicated actions. The law seems to be at odds with the double standard society seems to hold in this area. 74 The most difficult task of the criminal law here is trying to decipher intentions and actions at a time when both the victim and the accused had a temporary distorted reality where judgments are clouded and social constraints are less of a worry due to lowered inhibitions.
75
Reaso a le Belief i the Vi ti 's Capa ity
The statutory definition of rape contained within the Sexual Offences Act 2003 considers not mere non-o se t, ut the a used s easo able belief that consent was present. 76 The usual concept with any kind of objective standard within criminal law is to remove intoxication from the situation. For example, within the rules of self-defence and mistake, we ask if the mistaken belief that violence as e essa as a esult of the defe da t s i to i atio -if it was, then the defendant cannot rely on that mistake, even if it was honestly made.
77
I to i atio appea s to e o e the easo a le element from any belief held because heavy alcohol consumption does not make us reasonable beings. An intoxicated man may genuinely believe that the victim is consenting to sex, or that the victim has the capacity to consent to sex, but is that belief reasonably held?
There are many signs that would likely send a signal to the accused that the victim is in a heavily intoxicated state. For example, excessive vomiting, or being unable to walk or stand unaided. 78 Can the accused hold a reasonable belief that the victim gave genuine consent or had the capacity to do so in such circumstances? Many academics have advocated for a level beyond which capacity, and the a used s easo a le elief i apa it to o se t o o se t itself, ould e i se ious dou t.
79
Do the facts in a case such as Bree, where the victim was vomiting, and had to be showered and put to bed, not suggest a person who is intoxicated beyond the point of capacity to consent? 80 To a sober person this may be obvious, but to an intoxicated person in a similar position, perhaps not. Focus group studies on similar facts have found this to be the general opinion of participants., with most evaluating that the accused should be acquitted. 81 Some participants did recognise that the accused should have realised he should not have had sexual intercourse with the victim when she had been vomiting, but that alone was not enough to suggest that she actually lacked capacity to consent. 82 In fact, so e poi ted out that it as u easo a le to e pe t a a used ho had ee mutually drinking with the victim to be able to appreciate the point at which she lacked the ability to give genuine legal consent. 83 However, not all victims may be so visibly drunk, a d pe haps a a used s elief a e o e likel dee ed easo a le if this as the ase, ith othe it esses also is al ulati g the i ti s hea state of intoxication. 84 Of course, Bree was not decided this way, and this leaves a spectacularly high threshold for how intoxicated a victim must be before capacity to consent is negated. 85 Perhaps consent will be mistakenly conferred in such circumstances, giving the accused a reasonable belief in consent. So we might also need to ask if the victim had the capacity to correct such a mistake?
One of the biggest problem with intoxicated sexual relations is that cues may be vague and indirect. Ryan asserts that in a drunken state, the accused might acknowledge only those which are consistent with his belief that the victim wants to engage in sex. 86 Of course, ignoring any that indicate otherwise is a reckless act and would be likely to negate reasonable belief. At the time of pe et atio , o ea s o, e e if the a used e og ised se e al othe es i di ato s prior to this. Ho e e , o e stud has sho that % of the o e su e ed had i fa t used toke esista e at least once with potential suitors, 87 so the intoxicated confusion over precursors is certainly a grey area.
This conundrum is by no means unique to our jurisdiction, and is debated in courts throughout the Western world. A pai of o t asti g ases i Califo ia dis ussed the topi of the a used s intoxicated belief that the victim had capacity to give consent. Whilst one case considered an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief that the victim retained her capacity was held to be a defence to rape in one case, 88 an earlier case had held that such an intoxicated belief in genuine consent would not be reasonable or in good faith. 89 If the accused and the victim are equally intoxicated, navigating this path to apportion blame is difficult. If the victim was much more excessively intoxicated than the accused, this may be a much easier scenario to deal with. Such circumstances may also negate any belief being reasonable because the accused would be in a much better position to assess the 79 See for example Cowan, Supra n(19) 901 80 Ibid, 915. The o iti g a gu e t a e ou te ed ith a elief of the a used that this so e ed up the victim, as shows the evidence given by the defendant in Bree. 81 It would not be just to ask for only honest belief from the intoxicated accused, and reasonable belief of the so e a used. Assessi g all the i u sta es to de iphe a a used s elief i legall alid consent does not include voluntary intoxication. 92 The need for a belief to reasonable rather than just honest was included in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 with good reason. 93 Honest belief remains as a e e a kg ou d i u sta e to assessi g if the a used s elief ould e dee ed reasonable.
94 So remains the problem that if an accused takes advantage of a drunk victim, aware that her choices may be affected by her intoxication, only the broad scope of section 74 is available to guide the courts on these issues of consent. 95 An interesting idea is summed up by Goodman:
A iguous o se t e o es o e a iguous a d less a le to o stitute ade uate o se t to egate a ha ge of ape, the o e al ohol a fe ale has o su ed
96
She articulates that any dissent, even mild forms, should be enough to have the accused realise that proceeding with sexual relations could be non-consensual. 97 Perhaps the notion that affirmative consent is required, rather than a lack of dissent, is an idea to be seriously explored.
It is unlikely the accused is the only person in the unfortunate situation to miss cues and precursors we might less easily recognise when drunk. The victim too may, due to intoxication, fail to realise the a used s i te tio s u til the situatio is upo he . I the ase of Bree, the defendant brought the victim a glass of water and helped her to bed. This is hardly something even a sober person would recognise is a seductive precursor to sexual activity. If the victim misses cues that the accused is interested in having sexual relations with her because of her voluntarily intoxicated state, does this have any impact on his reasonable belief based upon her lack of dissent? 98 This may add more weight to the argument for the necessity of an affirmative consent being required in cases of intoxicated intercourse.
Retrospective Regret and Memory Loss
actions and behaviour. Almost half of respondents reported that drinking spirits made them feel se and confident, 134 and drinking to achieve such emotions was reported more by women than men. They also found that whilst respondents were aware of the negative impact particular types of al ohol ight ha e, su h as ausi g agg essi e eha iou , the a ed the positi e e otio s that went with them. This is suppo ted K a e s elief that the e is an expectancy that alcohol will increase sexual arousal and lower inhibitio s fo o e hilst i easi g e s feeli gs off dominance, 135 eati g a al ohol opia hi h de iates f o so iall a epta le eha iou .
136
The Way Forward
Cases are generally not as concerned with actually lacking capacity as they are with a victim lacking the capacity to choose as her sober self would have. When a victim cannot remember if she consented to sexual intercourse with the accused or not, or if she was even capable of consenting, do e allo he to judge this he so e sta da ds, o allo the defe da t s a ou t to esh ith hers and fill in the gaps? Neither are an appealing prospect, but without the benefit of an eyewitness, other options are lacking.
There is no clear way to establish between different levels of intoxicated states to decide if a person legally had the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse at the time it took place. There is also no exact way to establish if consent occurred at all for an intoxicated victim who cannot fully remember the events. Though a i ti s de isio to ha e i to i ated se a ot s ua e ith hat she ight have chosen sober, 137 if she has indeed chosen and was capable of doing so this must be respected, even if her sober mind is unhappy with this outcome.
It might be advantageous to have a non-exhaustive list of precursors that might be used as evidence of incapacity to consent. This could include physical manifestations of heavy intoxication such as vomiting, inability to stand and walk, having to be undressed and a wish to lay down. That fact that the i ti s d i ki g ade the ape possi le does ot la la e at the i ti s feet. Equally, just because the likelihood of a victim having consenting to sex might have increased with their consumption of alcohol, this does not mean that they did, no that we should presume this.
For the victim who is capable of giving consent but has partaken in excessive alcohol consumption, there are opportunities for reform. Good a s recommendation of a sliding scale, requiring a more explicit affirmation of consent the more a person is intoxicated, has much merit.
138 This is equally applicable to the alcohol consumption of the accused -the less he has had to drink, the more he is responsible for gaining effective legal consent. 139 This may assist in shifting the focus from blaming the victim for their alcohol consumption, to requiring specific express consent in such a situation to make her desires very clear. This will still not necessarily match with her sober desires, but will give the courts a clear way forward. Of course, there are other paths. If excessive voluntary intoxication was included in the list of rebuttable presumptions as the Home Office Report had suggested, we would begin with a presumption of non-consent, with the burden then being on the defendant to prove otherwise. 134 ibid 135 Kramer Supra n() 120 136 Goodman Supra n() 84 137 Cole Supra n() 160 138 Goodman Supa n() 58 139 Ibid 59
There is merit in sending a clear message to the public about intoxicated behaviour and sexual relationships, specifically circumstances in which sexual activity is likely to be wrong. 140 This may be especially important for situations of acquaintance rape and mutual risk-taking. A woman has the right to express her sexual desires, but also to refuse sexual situations as she sees fit. However, we must proceed with caution, and allow the judiciary to maintain flexibility when dealing with the extremes of human behaviour. 141 A statute establishing the definition of capacity and incapacity to consent may present a narrow context which, though may bring consistency, would also bring its own complications. 
